PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Remembrance of Things Past: Trust and the Obligations of the Intellectual

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Change in higher education is often incremental and unplanned or fueled by crisis. On the one hand, postsecondary institutions implement one or another policy; and over a number of years, small changes take place. On the other, a state or institution is beset by a serious fiscal shortfall, and significant cuts occur. The result is that any sense of long-range planning is
absent and planned systemic change fails. One alternative exercise is to think about the future and what higher education might look like 25 years from now. The point is not merely to paint a futuristic portrait; rather, if the scenario is plausible, then one needs to consider the steps those of us in academe might take either to change the portrait or to ensure that the picture comes into being.

Accordingly, in this essay I sketch what higher education might look like in 2027. I pay particular attention to issues of access and shared governance. I begin by outlining where I think higher education might be in a quarter century; I then discuss the reasons why I suspect that we will continue to have problems of equal access, and why shared governance will be vastly different from what we currently think of as the ideal. I focus the discussion on the lack of “social capital” and “trust.” I conclude with recommendations about how to overcome the problems I have outlined.

**Higher Education in 2027**

Access remains a problem in 2027. Even though for-profits have surprisingly taken up some of the slack as those little publics went out of business, the divide between the rich and the poor has only grown. Whereas we used to argue about the creation of a permanent underclass, today in 2027 we accept it as a social fact.

Full-time tenure-track faculty are down to 20% at all but the top 50 universities. Although we have made terrific gains in distance learning, it still seems irksome that the rich get to go to college the way I did, and the poor mostly work through some variation of the Internet to earn a degree. And they complete at a vastly lower rate.

Because there are so few full-time faculty, governance resembles business much more than what universities looked like back in 2002. Some will look on the remarkable increase in collective bargaining as a major accomplishment. It is, if we are discussing faculty personnel issues. Without collective bargaining, part-time faculty would never be paid the salaries that they need. Issues like retirement and health benefits would have been off the table. But in terms of faculty ownership of the curriculum, of a sense of academic community where faculty have mutual obligations to one another, to their institution, and to society—that has been pretty much lost. Part-timers come in, teach a class, and go home—or more likely go to another campus to teach another course.

**The Problem of Access**

By 2002 I had been doing research about college preparation programs for more than a decade (Tierney & Hagedorn, 2002; Tierney, forthcoming;
Tierney, Corwin, & Colyar, in press). When affirmative action was killed, I wanted to figure out how academics might become more involved in schools. One route was through understanding what enabled low-income urban minority youth to get into college. In a perfect world, college preparation programs would not be necessary. Schools should have equipped youth with the requisite academic and cultural skills to graduate from high school and enter college. But anyone who set foot in some of the schools I did back at the turn of the 21st century would know that those schools were not preparing adolescents for college.

Instead, a lucky few received what I came to think of academic triage. The underlying assumptions of college preparation programs were not unlike triage for disaster victims, albeit most of the patients in college preparation programs were young and poor, African American or Latino. One in ten American families—a family of four—in 2002 had an annual income of less than $18,000 (Quindlen, 2002, p. 64). The school years for these children were akin to a disaster site. The weakest students were reminiscent of victims on the field. With limited supplies, one cannot save everyone; efforts were made to help the most likely survivors.

I recall working with one high school senior on his college essay. He had been born in Mexico and had come to the United States when he was in the third grade. During the summer after fourth grade he had an experience that changed his life.

"It was summer," Fernando said. "Summer vacation. I got up in the morning and my friend came over and asked me if I wanted to play. I said, yes, but when I think about it now I think I knew something was going to happen, that I should have stayed home. But I got up and we started walking down an alley near my house and there was a noise, a loud noise. I felt my neck and then I saw blood. It came in here"—he motioned with his left hand to the back of his neck—and then he motioned to the right side of his chin—"and it went out there. I ran to my neighbor’s house and they got my mom and they took me to a hospital and eventually the doctor told her it would be all right."

When I asked Fernando what went through his head when he thought about the shooting, he first said that he tried not to think about it. Then he said: "I think that if I tell people about this that they will think I’m bad, I’m a bad guy. That I’m in a gang or that I go with bad people, or that I’m someone who creates trouble, that I’m bad and I deserved it."

Another summer back then found me working with another group of kids. As I sat with one boy who was Zapotec from a village outside Oaxaca, I noticed that he had problems with prepositions and adverbs as he wrote his college essay. He had come to the United States when he was about eight, but his writing still had serious problems. “Roberto,” I asked, “when you write do you translate from Spanish to English?” He had a bright smile and
the beginnings of a mustache. He nodded yes. “Actually,” he whispered, “I first think in Zapotec and then Spanish and then English.”

True, his college essay had grammatical problems and we had to work on them. But how do we interpret this event? Who was the smart person: the 17-year-old who spoke Zapotec, Spanish, and English, or the 49-year-old who knew English and a smattering of Spanish?

I recall feeling helpless—that none of the refereed articles I would write were going to help Fernando or Roberto. True, the academic shouldn’t place him—or herself as a savior, as Moses coming down from the mountaintop with the answers; but at the beginning of the 21st century the country faced so many problems, and it seemed to me at times that we were academic Pontius Pilates, washing our collective hands of responsibility, rather than dirtying them with the hard work of engagement with the public, and especially the schools.

The 20th century had been a time of sector differentiation between K-12 and higher education. A firewall had been built; and when the public blamed the schools for a failing educational system, for the most part academics sat on the sidelines. But students like Fernando and Roberto needed a longitudinal support network that helped youth reflect on their own lives and incorporate their own unique backgrounds into a framework for learning. In Fernando’s case, my suggestion would have meant that the school and a local postsecondary institution would have worked in concert to affirm his Latino background. He would have seen a violent act against himself, not as a reason to be looked on as a “bad kid,” but for what it was—a criminal act in a violent society. He would have been given the tools to contextualize violent acts. His parents would have been involved actively in the school and in thinking about college. Instead, his mother and father, neither of whom spoke English, were left by the wayside.

I eventually grew despondent about the worth of college preparation programs. The academic and social problems that students faced after years of substandard schooling most likely could not be remedied in a short period. A systematic and structured approach to learning that incorporated the cultural backgrounds of youth seemed to be better able to respond to the dynamics of learning. For that to have happened, colleges, universities, and faculties would have to have been more actively involved with the schools and families.

**The Problem of Shared Governance**

The other part of my research back then was looking at governance and faculty work. In a survey James Minor and I sent to 3500 individuals at 750 institutions, we found that the main issues that faculty worked on were employment-related policies, such as retirement and health benefits (Tierney
& Minor, 2003). Academic issues such as a concern for the curriculum, general education, or rethinking promotion and tenure policies to enable more civic engagement were generally absent. In subsequent case studies, we heard faculty speak of an increasing sense of disengagement from the university, much less formal governance. We learned from interviewing faculty senate presidents and reviewing background data on academic decision-making that faculty felt an increasing sense of disengagement. The overwhelming sense from our interviews and the survey was that faculty were more tied to their disciplines than their institutions.

Such a finding was not particularly surprising. Bob Clark (1983, 1987), Tony Becher (1987), and others (Tierney & Rhoads, 1993) had written about the four cultures of the faculty, with the discipline having gained prominence after World War II. However, by the end of the 20th century, something else was happening. The profession of being a professor was eroding, and in consequence, one’s identity and affiliation at the institutional level was lessened even more.

From a sociological perspective, academic communities had a shortage of social capital. “Social capital,” wrote Robert Putnam (1995), “refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (p. 67). At a time when colleges and universities were undergoing great changes, members of the professoriate were less engaged in their communities. Social capital, in an academic community, refers to the willingness of faculty members to participate in the academic life of the institution and their community. Civic engagement pertains not simply to whether a professor shows up to teach a class, but also to the myriad connections of academic life. The theory of social capital is important because the more connections that exist, the greater the trust, which in turn, enables organizations to change.

The assumptions of social capital have roots dating back to Durkheim and Marx. Durkheim’s focus on the bonds of social affiliation in a group as a way to overcome anomie is an example of social capital. Marx made careful distinctions between the atomized class and a mobilized class that aimed to overcome injustices. Social capital was viewed by some, such as Pierre Bourdieu (1986), as the reproduction of inequality, and by others, such as James Coleman (1990) and Robert Putnam (1995), as a basis for social solidarity that made trust possible (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Dika & Singh, 2002). I tended to see both views as complementary rather than contradictory. Social capital could reproduce exclusion and inequality; it also could be used to create the conditions for trust.

 Alejandro Portes (1998) made the useful point that “whereas economic capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads, social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships. To possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is those others, not
himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage” (p. 7). Social capital, then, is the glue that helps keep the academic community together. At the turn of the 21st century, that glue had all but dissolved.

At the turn of the 20th century, faculty had an investment in their institution. If they were to do their work well, they needed a good college or university. For research, in 1900, universities were pretty much the only game in town in the United States. Even after World War II, public support of higher education enabled research to take place on campuses. If one wanted a bachelor’s degree, one attended a four-year institution.

A century later, the contexts had changed. Business and industry increasingly funded research efforts. Laboratories outside the university were likely to call upon faculty so that the university became little more than a holding company. As Simon Marginson and Mark Considine documented so well, the effects of globalization on faculty were that they increasingly became free agents in search of entrepreneurial activities that helped augment shrinking salaries (Marginson & Considine, 2000).

Distance learning, corporate universities, and for-profit universities dramatically changed the climate for teaching and learning on campus. David Collis, a business professor at Harvard, had written a series of articles in the early 21st century predicting disaster for traditional colleges and universities if they didn’t act. One memorable phrase he had used was that postsecondary institutions were “frozen in panic in the headlights of the oncoming educational revolution” (in press, p. 2). But David Breneman (2002) flatly rejected such an assertion: “The notion that traditional institutions as a group are threatened or likely to be run out of business by these aggressive new colleges is simply nonsense” (p. B9).

With the benefit of hindsight, I can say that where Collis and Breneman missed the boat was not about whether a disaster was coming, but rather in the effect on faculty of the unarguably turbulent environment. The point is not that 4,000 institutions were about to go out of business, as Peter Drucker had so blithely predicted, or that all of those institutions are still in existence.

What had changed was the culture of the academy—in large part because of the external environment. Neither administrators nor faculty were the culprits. We were unable to respond creatively to the pressures of the marketplace. For most of the 20th century, those of us in colleges and universities became comfortable saying, “trust me” when the state, parents, or students asked a question. How do we know that subsidies are being used wisely? Trust me. How do we know if faculty are productive? Trust me. How do we know if students are learning anything? Trust me.

The response to the demand for trust from society was two-fold. On the one hand, those who asked the questions developed elaborate mechanisms to evaluate, measure, and regulate the institutions so that they got the answers they wanted. On the other hand, cultural support for higher educa-
tion as an institution eroded to the point at which we stand today. Highly
talented people are no longer attracted to academic life in 2027. Colleges
and universities are no longer engines of social or economic change. States
still provide a bit of money for public institutions, but the sense that col-
leges and universities are vital cores to our civic enterprise has gone by the
wayside.
I assume now, as I did then, that colleges and universities have two core
ideals. One was the goal of civic engagement in the pursuit of a more just
society. The other was a concern for academic freedom and the pursuit of
truth, regardless of where it took us. The governance of an institution had
to be aimed to foster those twin goals. I agree with Henry Giroux (2001)
when he wrote:

Higher education increasingly devalues its role as a democratic public sphere
committed to the broader values of an engaged and critical citizenry. Private
gain now cancels out the public good, and knowledge that does not imme-
diately translate into jobs or profits is considered ornamental. In this context,
pedagogy is depoliticized and academic culture becomes the medium for
sorting students and placing them into an iniquitous social order that cel-
brates commercial power at the expense of broader civil and public values.
(p. 23)

The loss, of course, was not simply to those of us who worked in colleges
and universities, but to society as well. A Catch-22 ensued during the early
years of the 21st century; we repeated variations of the "trust us" refrain. In
their lack of trust, the state and the public reduced their support and looked
elsewhere. Those of us in academe either retreated to our own private spaces
within our disciplines or attempted to garner the resources to continue our
work until gaining fiscal support supplanted engagement and academic free-
dom as the goal. The relentless obsession with performance-based indica-
tors reduced students who should have been thought of as unique individuals
with talents to be developed for democratic engagement to individuals read-
ied for utilitarian tasks.

Of course, individuals should have jobs. Of course, students should have
the skills necessary to perform productive tasks. But in a democracy such
goals are minimalist. They do not serve the citizenry well if these goals are
used as the end, rather than as simply one end, of a college education. As
Richard Rorty (1998) once wrote, “All the universities worthy of the name
have always been centers of social protest. If American universities ever cease
to be such centers, they will lose their self-respect and the respect of the
learned world" (p. 82). In the early 21st century, we lost that critical role.

What might we have done?
Colleges and universities lost the trust of society in the late 20th century.
As Donald Kennedy (1997) noted, “The relationship between universities
and their public is more dependent on trust than anything else” (p. 210). Outsiders were unable to look us in our organizational eyes and determine if we were trustworthy.

**Trust and Trustworthiness**

Two levels of trust need to exist for higher education to function effectively. Faculty and administrators need to trust one another—or rather, they need to believe that each is trustworthy. And external constituencies need to believe that colleges and universities are trustworthy. With both examples, we have two parties and an outcome. X trusts Y to do Z. I will focus for the moment on the problem of external constituencies’ lack of trust in academe; but as I will discuss, the problem also relates to the relationship between faculty and administrators. Indeed, at the end of the 20th century, there was an explosion of research about organizations and trust (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Miller, 2001; Sennett, 1998; Tyler, 1998), but curiously little research about trust and academic organizations.

We might think of trust as a continuum. At one end is an infant who inherently trusts his or her mother and father. The infant X trusts parent Y to do Z. The infant is helpless and, ideally, learns through repeated actions to trust the parent. When a parent picks up and feeds a crying infant, more than a functional act is happening. The infant is learning that he or she matters to the parent. The parent is trustworthy. True, there are numerous examples in which an infant learn the opposite lesson; but the infant-parent connection is perhaps the clearest example of one end of the continuum. At the other end are two parties who act according to a contract. X is able to assume the trustworthiness of Y to do Z only if a contract is written. If Y does not do Z, then X has recourse to the courts, sanctions, and fines.

By the end of the 20th century, numerous civic entities had lost the public trust. Any good writer knows not to personify inanimate objects. We also know that the citizenry frequently do just that. I ought not to have written, for example, that the public looked into the organizational eyes of colleges and universities. Organizations don’t have eyes; individuals do. However, when we think of civic entities in an age of mass communication, the way people learn about organizational life is not through an inanimate object, but through people. Trust in government dropped because of the actions of Richard Nixon and his cronies. Bill Clinton’s parsing of language—”it depends on what the meaning of ‘is’ is”—made not just himself but his government less trustworthy. The Catholic Church’s unwillingness and inability to deal with priests who couldn’t keep their hands off children caused people to lose faith in the trustworthiness of the people who led the Church but, interestingly, not their faith. Those who have been most abused by the legal system find it the least trustworthy. The results of a 1999 national sur-
vey of public perceptions of state courts revealed that African Americans were less likely than Anglos to trust the justice system (National Center for State Courts, 1999, p. 13). Respondents who reported lower incomes also had lower levels of trust in the justice system than those with higher incomes and higher levels of education (p. 13). Overall, the proportion of Americans saying that most people could be trusted fell by more than a third between 1960 and the end of the century (Putnam, 1995, p. 73).

Many scholars who have written about trust from a sociological perspective use a rational choice model (Dunn, 1988; Hardin, 1993; Morse, 1999). Rational choice assumes that trust is a subjective assumption by an individual about what is going to happen. The trusted have incentives to fulfill the trust, and the trusters have information and knowledge that enables the trusters to trust. Gambetta (1988) wrote, “When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial, or at least not detrimental, to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him” (p. 217).

The problem with the rational choice model was that it was overly individualistic. Although my example a moment ago of the infant and parent is useful, we also know that we must pay attention to the social contexts in which individuals are embedded (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Trust needs to be contextualized and understood, not merely from a psychological standpoint, but also from a perspective that seeks to interpret how the actors define the individual and how that individual acts/reacts within society (Seligman, 1997).

If trust and trustworthiness are in general based on reciprocity, then a parent’s job is two-fold. The child needs to learn not only to be trustworthy, but also how to trust. Under what conditions will X trust Y to do Z? Parents want to believe that when they give the car keys to their teenage son, and he says he won’t drink and drive, that he is trustworthy. Through repeated experiences, parents learn whether their son is trustworthy.

At the same time, parents have to teach children not to trust everyone. As Jennifer Morse (1999) notes, “It [is] not reasonable to trust a stranger to the same extent that one trusts one’s most intimate family members” (p. 298). Trust, then, is a result as well as a precondition of cooperation. Trust involves giving power to someone else who will affect one’s interests. The possibility always exists that the one who is trusted will betray that trust.

As Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna (1996) have written, “The logic of reciprocity-based trust is simple: ‘I will engage in trust behavior because I believe you are likely to do the same’” (p. 373). As with the idea of social capital, the assumptions of reciprocity and trust are rooted in the sociological and anthropological tradition. Marcell Mauss (1967), for example, wrote in his classic essay about gift-giving that the giver always gave a gift with a sense of
some form of reciprocity and social exchange. Such a point is useful because it highlights the social interactions involved in trust; trust is not simply a cognitive response of one individual.

The adult learns to trust as a means of cooperation. Russell Hardin (2002), a professor of political science, speaks of *encapsulated* trust. “I trust you,” he writes, “because I think it is in your interest to take my interests in the relevant matter seriously” (p. 1). Hardin speaks of the need, not for a philosophically based ontological understanding of knowledge about trust, but a street-level epistemology of trust based on an understanding of what he calls “thick relationships” (p. 510). Trust as encapsulated interest has to be learned over time. X trusts Y to do Z, not simply as a single act never to be repeated again, but more likely, X trusts Y to do not only Z, but also A, B, C and so on, and to refrain from doing M, N, and O.

One can neither command nor coerce an individual to trust. Although I may do what you want because you have power over me or you have coerced me, I still will not trust you (Luhmann, 1980). Adam Seligman (1997) usefully points out, “What it is that cannot be demanded but only offered must then be something existing beyond role expectation” (p. 63). A teacher may demand certain behaviors from a student because of the roles that each assume. For a trusting relationship to occur, however, it is necessary to believe that the relationship one has with the other individual is useful and the truster has confidence. An element of risk is involved, but it is embedded in the ongoing social contexts of the actors.

If someone wants my trust, I must also be competent to do what I am trusted to do. A group of vacationers may trust me to fly an airplane and get them to their destination; but if I have little training in flying planes, I ought not to be trusted. My intentions may be good, but my competence is not.

There are conditions of trust, and the call for an understanding of thick relationships takes into account the cultural and social contexts which individuals occupy. One’s age, race, gender, sexual orientation, and the like all come into play in determining trust and trustworthiness. A stranger in a grocery store may be able to play peek-a-boo with an infant because the infant has not learned to distrust the stranger. But by the early 21st century, most young boys and girls had learned to be wary if a stranger spoke to them.

Jimmy Carter spoke of those whose hopes and dreams were repeatedly shattered as having “hopelessness based on sound judgment” (Hardin, 2002, p. 119). And yet, a foundation of a democratic society has to be bound in some way to the ability of members of the populace to trust one another and their civic organizations. “We are concerned with trust and trustworthiness because they enable us to cooperate,” writes Russell Hardin (2002, p. 173).

In a democratic society, civic organizations such as a college or university have to function in some part by way of trust and trustworthiness for the simple reason that the search for truth is just that—a search. There is no
guarantee, when a teacher explores ideas in the classroom or in the laboratory, that the search will be successful. In his 1876 inaugural address as the first president of the Johns Hopkins University, Daniel Coit Gilman predicted that the advent of the modern research university would lead to “less misery among the poor, less ignorance in schools, less bigotry in the temple, less suffering in the hospital, less fraud in business, less folly in politics” (Johns Hopkins, 1876). As Gordon Davies (2001) has noted, “Gilman’s vision is easy to dismiss as a naïve expression of nineteenth-century liberalism. But it is also a generous and courageous statement of the social responsibility of colleges and universities in a democratic society” (p. B17).

Gilman’s idea was not simply courageous. It was also risky. Gilman called for society to trust the university. In return, the faculty and administrators needed to prove their trustworthiness. Those who are cynics and skeptics would have the university reduce its reach to measurable goals. There must be some in-between place where, on the one hand, the academic does not arrogantly treat the citizenry as infants, brushing aside their questions with “trust me,” and, on the other, where the citizens do not govern all social action by legal contracts. We learned in the late 20th century that society would no longer exercise blind faith in the academy on demand. But if we are governed strictly by contractual obligations, the ambitious goals that Gilman outlined are swept away. The responsibility of the intellectual is reduced to a sequence of job-specific tasks. As Gary Rhoades (1998) so aptly pointed out, the academic became a managed professional whose scope was limited and ambitions contained.

I always believed that the work of the intellectual was different from that of a plumber or electrician. Academic life is a calling, a vocation, in the best sense of the word. The responsibility of the intellectual in working in the most privileged institution in society is five-fold. These five responsibilities relate to the internal dynamic of the institution and how society comes to determine that the college or university is trustworthy.

First, as engaged intellectuals, we need to remember our roots. As we move up the academic ladder, we betray a core value if we do not lift as we climb. This implicit notion of humanity is based on an ethic of care, first defined by Mary Church Terrell, the first president of the National Association of Colored Women, in 1900 (Wesley, 1984; Davis, 1996). For the engaged intellectual such a command assumes that as we move up we will ensure that others climb with us. We lift as we climb.

Second, the responsibility of the intellectual requires humility. If intellectuals during the course of their careers learn anything, it is not how much we know, but how much we do not.

Third, in a democracy, such a responsibility demands civic engagement. “A tyrannical government,” wrote medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas (1966), “is directed not to the common good, but to the private good.” In a
democracy, then, our work must be directed toward the common good. Of necessity, a concern for the common good must take into account those who are at the margins of society to consider ways that they might seize voice within democracy.

Fourth, the institution must work toward understanding not merely society’s commonalities, but its differences. As Craig Calhoun (1998) has written:

If we are to produce a dynamic discourse about the conditions of collective life in our large-scale society, we need not just a language of community that celebrates our commonalities. [We must also have] a language of public life that starts with recognition of deep differences among us and builds faith in meaningful communication across lines of difference. It must empower us for discourse about the workings of large-scale social and economic systems, not reduce our large-scale conversations to mass celebrations and mass panics. (p. 32)

And fifth, those who work in academe must model those behaviors that we want to see in society. As the late Senator Paul Wellstone said, “Never separate the lives you live from the words you speak.” We cannot foster democracy if we ourselves are not democratic. We cannot speak to ideals of diversity and difference if we ourselves are not diverse and different. And we cannot make claims to trust if we ourselves are not trustworthy.

If, 25 years ago in 2002 I had been asked to defend public and higher education as a vital resource for democratic and civic life, with the benefit of hindsight, what might I have said?

First, if we take seriously the experiences of students like Fernando and Roberto, then the sharp divide that exists between K-12 and postsecondary education has to be overcome. Rather than look the other way or wash our hands of the problems of public education, we must create sustained, systematic involvement between postsecondary institutions and public schools. Of necessity, such involvement needs to work through dialogues based on humility and respect. If change is to happen, the arrogance of the intellectual who approaches conversations with school teachers as lessons to the less well-educated needs to be an artifact left behind in the 20th century.

Second, we should reinstill in our undergraduate and graduate students the importance of civic engagement. Such a suggestion assumes that, rather than retreat to the confines of one’s discipline, the public intellectual takes seriously the obligations of the institution. Service learning, community service, and the acknowledgment that the institution is embedded in a local community are all examples of paths to civic engagement.

Third, the academic needs to take the gift and responsibility of academic freedom seriously. At a time when the government expects mindless obedience on the part of the citizenry in a never-ending war, the intellectual
needs to speak up. A democracy needs to be a noisy conversation about the meaning of fundamental principles. When that conversation is stifled, democracy is at risk. As Edward Said (1996) succinctly pointed out: “Intellectuals should be the ones to question patriotic nationalism, corporate thinking and a sense of class, racial or gender privilege” (p. xiii). The obligation that has been granted to academics is not to shut up and mind our own business, but to create arenas for thoughtful discussion and debate.

The obligation of the intellectual must have something to do with truth telling. As John Michael (2000) notes, such a responsibility is necessary even if the truth told “is the difficult truth that there may be no easily definable single or universal truth” (p. 170). The search for truth is not the end of discussion but the continuation of one in which we must speak truth to power.

And fourth, we need to walk the talk. As faculty, we need to take seriously the governance of the institution. Too few individuals are involved, meetings are sporadic and ineffective, and the delineation of responsibilities has too easily been ceded to harried administrators who frequently feel overloaded with the complex decisions that need to be made. The point is neither to slow down decision-making nor circumscribe the prerogatives of administrative action. But if we are to be democratic change agents in society, then we must be democratic change agents in our own institutions.

REFERENCES


